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Testamentary rescue: An analysis of the intention 
requirement in Australia and South Africa 
Francois du Toit*  
This article provides a legal-comparative perspective on the rescue of formally irregular 
wills through the exercise of judicial dispensing powers in Australia and the comparable 
exercise of a judicial condonation power in South Africa. The article analyses in particular 
the requirement that the deceased must have intended the informal instrument in question 
as his or her will — a requirement common to the Australian and South African 
testamentary rescue dispensations. The article con- textualises the aforementioned analysis 
through a comparative examination sf judicial engagement with testamentary rescue in 
three scenarios that frequently confront Australian and South African courts, namely, the 
rescue of (i) instructions for the preparation of wills; (ii) draft wills; and (iii) suicide 
letters. 
I Introduction 
All Australian jurisdictions sourced their statutory formalities for the making of wills 
from s 9 of the Wills Act 1837 (UK).1 The statutory prescripts on the requirements for 
wills' formal validity are peremptory in all Australian jurisdictions.2 These prescripts 
fulfil an array of functions, such as securing the authenticity of testators' dispositive 
intent; emphasising the solemnity of the testamentary act; and protecting testators 
against fraud and undue influence.3 However, Australian courts' enforcement of these 
prescripts' strict observance negated testators' dispositive intent where the 
instruments embodying such intent were invalid for want of compliance with the 
requirements for wills' formal validity.4 Consequently, all Australian jurisdictions 
enacted dispensing powers that enable courts to dispense with aspects of wills' formal 
validity in order to remedy the nullification of testamentary intent in instances of 
formally irregular and, therefore, invalid wills.5 
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 1 A G Lang, 'Formality v Intention — Wills in an Australian Supermarket' (1985) 15 MULR 82 at 85. 
 2 R F Croucher and P Vines, Succession: Families, Property and Death: Text and Cases, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013,  
    pp 284-5. 
3 Lang, above n 1, at 87-9. 
4 Ibid, at 103. 
5 Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 11A; Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 8 (formerly Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 s 
18A); Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 10; Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 18 (formerly Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 9(a)); Wills Act 
1936 (SA) s 12(2); Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 10 (formerly Wills Act 1992 (Tas) s 26); Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 9; Wills Act 
1970 (WA) s 32 (formerly Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 34). Australian courts have acknowledged the remedial nature of the 
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Lang's analysis of early dispensing judgments in South Australia (the first 
Australian jurisdiction to enact a judicial dispensing power in 1975) shows the 
relatively innocuous defects in wills' execution that would have resulted, but for the 
exercise of the dispensing power, in those wills' refusal to probate and, therefore, the 
negation of the testators' dispositive intent. These errors included witnesses' failure to 
attest to a testator's signature; witnesses' absence when a testator signed a will; and a 
witness's acknowledgement of his or her signature to another witness who was absent 
when the former witness signed the will.6 However, in the course of time, as Lang 
notes,7 Australian probate courts faced more complex testamentary rescue cases that 
featured not only more drastic departures from the statutory requirements for wills' 
formal validity but also concerned instruments not cast in typical testamentary form. 
Adjudication on such cases has yielded divergent outcomes, principally because 
Australian courts engaged in a varied manner with a requirement common to 
dispensing provisions in all Australian jurisdictions, namely, that the deceased must 
have intended the instrument in question as his or her will. Australian courts and 
legal scholars have identified this requirement as posing the greatest challenge to the 
exercise of dispensing powers.8 
Australia belongs to the Common Law legal family. South Africa, on the other hand, 
is a mixed jurisdiction where Roman-Dutch law, South Africa's civilian Common Law, 
was infused with aspects of the English Common Law in the aftermath of the second 
British occupation of the Cape of Good Hope (present-day Cape Town) in 1806.9 The 
British abolished the typically Civil Law wills in use at the Cape at the time and, from 
the middle of the nineteenth century, introduced legislation that mirrored the 
prescripts of the Wills Act 1837 (UK) regarding the execution of wills. These 
prescripts endured, and the current South African Wills Act 1953 10  therefore 
prescribes formalities similar to those found in its Australian counterparts insofar as 
a will's formal validity is procured, for the most part, by the signatures of the testator 
and two attesting witnesses. 11  The South African Wills Act's prescripts on the 
requirements for wills' formal validity serve the same purposes as those of 
corresponding Australian statutes, namely, curtailing opportunities for fraud and 
undue influence; obviating uncertainty; and ensuring that wills reflect testators' 
authentic and voluntary dispositions. 12  The Wills Act's formality prescripts are 
peremptory; consequently, non-compliance with one or more of the execution 
various dispensing provisions: see, eg, Estate of Peter Brock (2007) 1 ASTLR 127; [2007] VSC 415; BC200709039 (24 
October 2007) at [19]-[20] on the Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 9; In the Estate of Frank William Davis (dec'd) (2011) 7 ASTLR 
572; [2011] SASC 143; BC201106690 (2 September 2011) at [22] on the Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 12(2). 
6 Lang, above n 1, at 107. 
7 Ibid, at 107-8. 
8 See, eg, National Australia Trustees Ltd v Fazey; The Estate of Nancy Elaine Lees, Late of Strathfield [2011] NSWSC 
559; BC201103959 (10 June 2011) at [18]; P Vines, 'The Quality and Proof of Intention in the Dispensing Power: Lessons 
from a Short History' (2002) 9 APLJ 1 at 6. 
9 For an overview of the development of Roman-Dutch law as South Africa's Common Law, as well as the establishment of 
South Africa's mixed legal system, see A B Edwards, The History of South African Law — An Outline, Butterworths, 
1996, pp 13-100; R Zimmermann and D Visser, 'Introduction: South African Law as a Mixed Legal System' in Southern 
Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa, R Zimmermann and D Visser (Eds), Clarendon Press, 1996, pp 2-30. 
10 The Act commenced on 1 January 1954 but was amended on a number of occasions. South Africa is not a federal state and 
the Wills Act 1953 therefore applies uniformly throughout the Republic. 
11 Wills Act 1953 s 2(1)(a). 
12 M M Corbett, G Hofmeyr and E Kahn, The Law of Succession in South Africa, Juta, 2001, p 49. 
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formalities occasions a will's invalidity. It is unsurprising, therefore, that South 
African courts echoed their Australian counterparts' frustration at the negation of 
testators' dispositive intent in instances where courts' enforcement of the Wills Act's 
demand for strict formalism occasioned the invalidity of formally non-compliant wills 
and, therefore, a negation of testamentary intent.13 
The South African Law Commission responded in the early 1990s by 
recommending, first, that the Wills Act's formal requirements be relaxed (although 
only to a limited extent), and, second, that High Courts (the courts of first instance in 
all matters regarding wills and deceased estates) be empowered to dispense with 
aspects of wills' formal validity. 14  The commission's recommendations were 
incorporated in a draft Bill, and ultimately included in the Law of Succession 
Amendment Act 1992.15 This Act imported s 2(3) — a dispensing provision, or, as it is 
generally known in South Africa, a condonation provision — into the Wills Act 1953. 
Section 2(3) reads: 
If a court is satisfied that a document or the amendment of a document drafted or 
executed by a person who has died since the drafting or execution thereof, was 
intended to be his will or an amendment of his will, the court shall order the Master to 
accept that document, or that document as amended, for the purposes of the 
Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No 66 of 1965), as a will, although it does not 
comply with all the formalities for the execution or amendment of wills referred to in 
subs (1). 
It must be noted, by way of explication of the above provision, that the British 
introduced the English system of executorship to South Africa but that South Africa, 
unlike Australia, does not have a formal probate system. Nevertheless, the Master of 
the High Court's acceptance of a testamentary instrument, referred to in the above 
subsection, fulfils, by and large, the same role in South Africa as does probate courts' 
admission of similar instruments to probate in Australia. It is evident, therefore, that 
the South African Wills Act's condonation provision shares the objective of the 
dispensing provisions of its Australian counterparts, namely, to remedy the negative 
impact of testamentary formalism on testators' dispositive intent. This is achieved 
through the rescue of formally irregular, and therefore invalid, wills, and their 
admission to the formal legal process for the winding-up of deceased estates by 
executors. It is, moreover, unsurprising that early South African condonation 
judgments, in consonance with Lang's above-mentioned analysis of early South 
Australian dispensing judgments, concerned the rescue of wills where invalidity 
13 In Kidwell v The Master 1983 (1) SA 509 (E) a will was voided because the testator failed to sign its final page at the end 
thereof as prescribed by the Wills Act 1953. Kannemeyer J lamented that this outcome was 'unfortunate . .. and may 
frustrate the testator's intention . .. [but] is the result of a failure to observe a statutory requirement for the validity of wills 
which is peremptory': at 514F. In The Leprosy Mission v The Master of the Supreme Court 1972 (4) SA 173 (C) a will was 
voided because the same witnesses did not sign both pages of a 2-paged will. Corbett J said at 184H: 
I recognise that this is a hard case in the sense that on the evidence of the various witnesses there does not appear to be 
any doubt that the document in question genuinely represents the last will of the testatrix and in that invalidity will 
result in worthy beneficiaries being deprived of substantial bequests. Nevertheless, there are important questions of 
legislative policy and principle at stake which transcend the equities of the particular case. 
14 South African Law Commission (Project 22), Report on Review of the Law of Succession, 1991, at [2.29]. The 
commission's current appellation is the South African Law Reform Commission. 
15 The Act commenced on 1 October 1992. 
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resulted from relatively innocuous errors in the execution process.16 However, in the 
course of time South African courts were also confronted with cases that involved 
more drastic departures from the statutory requirements for wills' formal validity and 
also with instances where the instruments in question were not cast in typical 
testamentary form. These cases presented South African courts with challenges 
similar to those faced by their Australian counterparts. These similarities are 
occasioned, by and large, by the fact that the South African Wills Act's condonation 
provision requires, in the same vein as the various Australian statutory dispensing 
provisions, that the deceased must have intended the document in question as his or 
her will. This requirement has been as contentious in South Africa as it has been in 
Australia. 
The above synopsis shows that Australian and South African statutory provisions on 
testamentary rescue serve a common purpose, namely, the preservation of testators' 
dispositive intent despite defective compliance with statutory formality prescripts.17 
Moreover, these provisions' intention requirements pose challenges to courts in both 
legal systems. This article analyses, in the narrative legal-comparative tradition, the 
judicial approach to testamentary rescue and its intention requirement in particular 
in Australia and South Africa.18 
Orucu opines that comparative-law research occasions the improvement and 
consolidation of legal knowledge, not in the abstract, but of law in context.19 She 
contends, moreover, that comparative-law research involves essentially the 
comparison of legal rules, and, where the primary sources of law include court 
decisions, these must necessarily form part of comparative scholars' research focus.20 
Orucu also observes an increased interest among comparative scholars in mixed legal 
systems.21 This article on testamentary rescue in Australia and South Africa seeks to 
16 Eg, Horn v Horn 1995 (1) SA 48 (W) where witnesses failed to sign the deceased's will; Logue v The Master 1995 (1) SA 
199 (N) where, inter alia, the deceased signed only the second page of a 2-paged will; O'Connor v The Master 1999 (4) SA 
614 (NC) where the deceased signed a will with a thumbprint (which necessitated certification by a commissioner of 
oaths) but the will was defectively certified. 
17 The South African condonation provision permits testamentary rescue in instances of non-compliance with execution and 
amendment formalities. Australian dispensing provisions do likewise, but some Australian provisions include also 
formally irregular revocation within their regulatory ambit (eg, Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 11A; Succession Act 2006 
(NSW) s 8). The South African Wills Act 1953 s 2A regulates the condonation of informal acts of testamentary revocation 
separately from s 2(3)'s condonation of formally irregular execution and amendment. This article focuses predominantly 
on testamentary rescue in instances of non-compliance with execution formalities and, to a lesser extent, non-compliance 
with amendment formalities. Dispensing with formally irregular revocation falls outside the article's scope. 
18 The nature and various manifestations of testamentary intent are beyond this article's scope. It must be noted, however, 
that judicial engagement with testamentary intent in testamentary rescue cases differs, in South Africa and Australia, from 
that in, eg, cases concerning the interpretation or construction of wills. Both scenarios involve an inquiry into the 
deceased's intention, but the former concerns, as is shown later in this article, whether the deceased created the instrument 
in question with the animus testandi (the intention to make a will); the latter involves ascertaining the deceased's intention 
as manifested by the instrument in question. It is also shown later in the article that, in testamentary rescue cases, South 
African and Australian courts are willing to look beyond the instrument in question to the circumstances surrounding its 
creation to determine whether the deceased intended it as his or her will. In instances of testamentary interpretation or 
construction, on the other hand, South African and Australian courts are loath to look, save when apposite rules on the 
admission of evidence so permit, beyond the particular instrument itself to determine the deceased's intention: see M J de 
Waal and M C Schoeman-Malan, Law of Succession, Juta, 2008, p 221 on the South African position, and Croucher and 
Vines, above n 2, p 440 on the position in Australia. The South African Supreme Court of Appeal observed astutely in 
Van Wetten v Bosch 2004 (1) SA 348 (SCA) that the key question in a condonation application is not what the particular 
document means (that would be the question in an application for the interpretation or construction of the document), but 
whether the deceased intended the document as his or her will: at [15]—[16]. 
19 E Orucu, The Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-First Century, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2004, p 33. 
20 Ibid, p 49. 
21 Ibid, p 204. 
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address the aforementioned three hallmarks of contemporary legal-comparative 
research. First, it looks to consolidate legal knowledge in a heretofore 
under-researched field of Australian and South African legal-comparative inquiry. 
Second, its jurisprudential analysis focusses particularly on the convergences and 
divergences in Australian and South African courts' responses to the challenges that 
statutory provisions on testamentary rescue and their intention requirements in 
particular pose. Third, it aims to provide a contextualised comparison of 
testamentary rescue between Australia as a Common Law jurisdiction and South 
Africa as a mixed jurisdiction. To this end, the article examines three scenarios that 
have confronted Australian and South African courts in testamentary rescue cases: 
instructions for the preparation of wills; draft wills; and suicide letters. 
II Preliminary matters 
Australian courts will admit a formally irregular will or otherwise informal document 
to probate in terms of the applicable dispensing provisions upon the fulfilment of 
three requirements: (i) a document must exist; (ii) the document must embody the 
deceased's testamentary intentions; and (iii) the deceased must have intended the 
document as his or her will. South African courts will order condonation of similar 
instruments in terms of s 2(3) of the Wills Act 1953 if three requirements are met: (i) 
a document must exist; (ii) the deceased must have drafted or executed the 
document; and (iii) the deceased must have intended the document as his or her will. 
Before dealing with the intention aspect of testamentary rescue in Australia 
(requirements (ii) and (iii) aforementioned) and South Africa (requirement (iii) 
aforementioned), some preliminary observations on the document requirement in 
both legal systems are apposite. 
 
A. The existence of a document 
Documents of the classical paper variety naturally fall within the scope of all 
Australian dispensing provisions. Some Australian statutes on wills bring documents 
other than those of the classical paper variety within dispensing provisions' ambit22 
whereas interpretation statutes in other Australian jurisdictions occasion a similar 
effect.23 Consequently, Australian courts have granted probate to, among others, an 
audio tape that contained supplementary directions regarding the disposal of a 
deceased estate; 24  a (print-out of a) computer file that contained testamentary 
directives; 25  and an electronic document embodying testamentary intentions 
produced on a smart phone.26The South African position is different. Neither the 
22 Eg, the Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 32(1)(a)-(d) includes under its definition of 'document' anything on which there are marks, 
figures, symbols or perforations bearing a meaning for persons qualified to interpret them; anything from which sounds, 
images or writings can be reproduced with or without the aid of anything else; and a map, plan, drawing or photograph. 
The Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 10 is to similar effect. 
23 Eg, Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 36 read with Sch 1; Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) s 38; 
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 21. 
24 Treacey v Edwards; Estate of Edwards (2000) 49 NSWLR 739; [2000] NSWSC 846; BC200005014 with reliance on the 
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 21. 
25 Re Trethewey (2002) 4 VR 406; [2002] VSC 83; BC200201109 with reliance on the Interpretation of Legislation Act 
1984 (Vic) s 38. See also, eg, Yazbek v Yazbek [2012] NSWSC 594; BC201203869 (1 June 2012). 
26 Re: Yu [2013] QSC 322; BC201315105 (6 November 2013) with reliance on the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 36. 
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Wills Act 1953 nor the Interpretation Act 1957 contains a definition of 'document' 
comparable to those of their Australian counterparts. Binns-Ward J opined in Ex 
parte Porter27 that, in light of the absence of such definitions, the word 'document' in 
s 2(3) of the Wills Act 1953 must be given its ordinary meaning, determined with 
proper regard to its contextual employment.28 The Interpretation Act 1957 permits 
some leeway regarding written documents insofar as it states that, in every law, 
expressions relating to writing shall be construed, unless a contrary intention 
appears, as inclusive of typewriting, lithography, photography and all other modes of 
representing or reproducing words in visible form.29 However, whether informal 
electronic documents that express testamentary intent but that cannot be reduced to 
writing within the foregoing meaning are capable of rescue in South Africa remains 
uncertain. The fact that the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 2002 
which sets a statutory framework for the facilitation and regulation of electronic 
communications and transactions in South Africa expressly excludes wills from its 
regulatory ambit complicates this issue.30 
Nevertheless, South African courts have rescued informal testamentary 
instruments that existed, at least initially, in electronic form only. In Macdonald v 
The Master,31 for example, the deceased indicated in a note written shortly before he 
committed suicide that his will was to be found on his office computer. The particular 
computer file was accessed, printed, and thereafter presented to the court for 
condonation. The High Court, satisfied that the security measures with regard to the 
computer file were not breached and, therefore, that the unexecuted hard-copy 
version of the electronic document reflected the deceased's authentic testamentary 
dispositions, issued a condonation order.32 Hattingh J observed that '[t]he deceased's 
will was indeed a document that was stored in his computer in accordance with his 
instructions'. 33 Some legal scholars have construed the Macdonald judgment as 
accepting of electronic documents for the purpose of testamentary rescue in South 
Africa.34 The Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment in Van der Merwe v The Master35 
fortified this view. In this case an unexecuted will, sent as an electronic document by 
email, was printed and thereafter presented for judicial condonation. The court, again 
satisfied with the document's authenticity, granted a condonation order.36 Navsa JA 
in Van der Merwe echoed Hattingh J's sentiments in Macdonald when the former 
said that 'the document still exists on the deceased's computer'.37 Van der Merwe's 
case, therefore, provided further impetus to judicial engagement with informal 
27 2010 (5) SA 546 (WCC). 
28 Ibid, at [7]. 
29 Interpretation Act 1957 s 3. 
30 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 2002 s 4(3) read with Sch 1; s 4(4) read with Sch 2. 
31 2002 (5) SA 64 (O). 
32 Ibid, at 72E-G, 73B. 
33 Ibid, at 71I-J. 
34 Eg, S Cornelius, 'Condonation of Electronic Documents in Terms of Section 2(3) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953' (2003) 1 J S 
Afr L 208 at 210; M C Wood-Bodley, 'Macdonald v The Master: Computer Files and the "Rescue" Provision of the Wills 
Act' (2004) 121 S Afr LJ 34 at 38-9; M C Wood-Bodley 'Wills, Data Messages, and the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act' (2004) 121 S Afr LJ 526 at 527. 
35 2010 (6) SA 544 (SCA). 
36 Ibid, at [17]-[19]. 
37 Ibid, at [17]. 
6 
 
                                            
 
 
electronic documents in the context of South Africa's testamentary rescue 
dispensation. It has been contended, however, that the availability of the printed 
versions of the respective computer documents in the Macdonald and Van der 
Merwe cases renders these judgments less 'revolutionary' than they may at first 
glance appear.38 It has been suggested, therefore, that South Africa should follow the 
Australian example by defining statutorily the meaning of 'document' for the purpose 
of testamentary rescue. 39  Whether such a definition should include electronic 
instruments, and, if so, whether South African law's engagement with such 
instruments should be limited to the testamentary rescue sphere (as opposed to the 
full recognition of electronic wills) are questions beyond this article's scope. However, 
these issues are debated in contemporary South African legal scholarship.40 
B. Drafting or execution by the deceased 
The South African Wills Act's condonation provision differs from the dispensing 
provisions of its Australian counterparts insofar as the former requires the deceased 
to have drafted or executed the informal instrument in question. It is important to 
note that these two actions are stated in the alternative: the deceased must either 
have drafted or have executed the particular document. The meaning of 'executed' in 
this context is not entirely clear, but, in the opinion of some South African legal 
scholars, it entails simply that the deceased must have appended his or her signature 
at least once to the otherwise defectively-executed document.41 Accordingly, South 
African courts have granted condonation orders when the document in question bore 
the deceased's signature, but its formal irregularity was occasioned by, for example, 
defective attestation by witnesses.42 This approach corresponds with the Australian 
experience where, according to Vines, the likelihood of informal instruments being 
admitted to probate increases significantly when a document complies substantially 
with the formalities and where its only formal defect lies in, for example, the 
witnesses' defective attestation.43 
The South African Supreme Court of Appeal held in Bekker v Naude44 that, if the 
deceased did not execute the document in the aforementioned manner, the document 
is condonable only if the deceased drafted or otherwise created the document him or 
38 M de Waal, 'A Court's Power to Condone Non-Compliance with Testamentary Formalities (the "Dispensing Power"): 
The South African and Australian Experiences' in Confronting the Frontiers of Family and Succession Law: Liber 
Amicorum Walter Pintens Vol 1, A-L Verbeke et al (Eds), Intersentia, 2012, pp 417 at 433. 
39 F du Toit, 'Testamentary Condonation in South Africa: A Pyrrhic Victory for Private Autonomy over Mandatory 
Formalism in the Law of Wills?' in Verbeke et al, above n 38, pp 513 at 523. 
40 See, eg, J T Faber and P J Rabie, 'Van Tikmasjien tot Rekenaar: 'n Ondersoek na die Ontwikkeling van die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Erfreg in die Tegnologiese Era' (2005) 4 J S Afr L 767; A R van Staden and C Rautenbach, 'Enkele 
Gedagtes oor die Behoefte aan en Toekoms van Elektroniese Testamente' (2006) 39 De Jure 586; S Papadopoulos, 
'Electronic Wills with an Aura of Authenticity: Van der Merwe v Master of the High Court and Another' (2012) 24 SA 
Merc LJ 93. 
41 M C Wood-Bodley, 'Did You Say "Asinine" Milord? Bekker v Naude 2003 5 SA 173 (SCA)' (2004) 25 Obiter 222 at 
228-9; M J de Waal, 'The Courts' Power of Condonation in Respect of the Execution and Revocation of Wills: 
Unfortunate New Elements of Uncertainty' (2004) 121 S Afr LJ 529 at 532. 
42 See, eg, Logue v The Master 1995 (1) SA 199 (N) where the court condoned a document signed by the deceased but not by 
witnesses; Raubenheimer v Raubenheimer 2012 (5) SA 290 (SCA) where the court condoned a will signed by the testator 
and two witnesses, but not in each other's presence. 
43 Vines, above n 8, at 3. 
44 2003 (5) SA 173 (SCA). 
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herself.45 An unexecuted document prepared for the deceased by, for example, a 
solicitor is, accordingly, not condonable under the South African testamentary rescue 
dispensation. In the Australian case of In the Will and Estate of Brian Bateman46 the 
Supreme Court of Victoria granted probate of a draft will prepared for the deceased 
by the state trustees and signed by two witnesses but not by the deceased himself.47 If 
the abovementioned scholarly view regarding the South African condonation 
provision's execution requirement is correct, this case would have yielded a different 
outcome if it had served before a South African court. Such a court would have 
refused condonation because the deceased in the Bateman case had neither executed 
(signed it himself at least once) nor drafted personally the document in question. 
Therefore, the South African condonation provision's drafted-or-executed 
requirement in respect of the relevant instrument imposes a limitation (albeit an 
often-criticised one) 48  on testamentary rescue that is foreign to its Australian 
counterparts. Consequently, South African courts will disallow condonation in some 
instances where Australian courts are willing to exercise dispensing powers.49The 
South African condonation provision's prescript that the deceased must have drafted 
or executed the particular document occasions a further differentiation with the 
Australian position. In Treacey v Edwards; Estate of Edwards50 the NSW Supreme 
Court, acting under the dispensing provision of the former Wills, Probate and 
Administration Act 1898, admitted to probate a deceased's will as well as an audio 
tape that contained the deceased's supplementary testamentary dispositions. Austin J 
opined by way of an obiter dictum that incorporation by reference constituted an 
alternative (albeit more tenuous) basis for admitting the audio tape to probate.51 In 
light of the uncertainty in South African law regarding the question of whether 
informal non-paper instruments are capable of testamentary rescue,52 it is doubtful 
whether a South African court would condone an audio tape in circumstances similar 
to those in Treacey's case. But a South African court's rescue of that audio tape is 
unlikely for two further reasons. First, the deceased neither executed nor drafted 
personally the tape in Treacey. The Supreme Court of Appeal in Bekker v Naude,53 in 
its insistence on the deceased's personal drafting of an unexecuted informal 
document in order to bring it within the condonation provision's ambit, did not limit 
such drafting to personally-handwritten documents but acknowledged that typed 
45 Ibid, at [9], [19]. 
46 (2011) 9 ASTLR 188; [2011] VSC 277; BC201104678 (24 June 2011). 
47 Ibid, at [25], [49]. 
48 See, eg, M Paleker, 'Bekker v Naude: The Supreme Court of Appeal Settles the Meaning of "Drafted" in Section 2(3) of 
the Wills Act, but Creates a Potential Constitutional Problem' (2004) 121 S Afr LJ 27. 
49 Compare, eg, the judgment on cross-signed mirror wills of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Henriques v 
Giles NO 2010 (6) SA 51 (SCA) with that of the Supreme Court of South Australia in In the Estate of Hennekam (dec'd) 
(2009) 104 SASR 289; 264 LSJS 65; [2009] SASC 188; BC200905685. Both cases concerned spouses' wills. The South 
African court denied condonation of such wills on the ground that neither will was drafted personally by the testator for 
whom it was made (a solicitor prepared both wills), nor did either of the testators execute the 'correct' will: at [8]-[9]. The 
court instead dealt with the matter on the basis of testamentary rectification: at [15]-[24]. In Hennekam, on the other hand, 
the court preferred to exercise the dispensing power in terms of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 12(2) because it opined that the 
circumstances of the case represent 'precisely the "mischief to which the section is directed': at [36]. The court regarded 
rectification under the Act's s 25AA as an artificial remedy under the circumstances: at [36]-[37]. 
50 (2000) 49 NSWLR 739; [2000] NSWSC 846; BC200005014. 
51 Ibid, at [32]-[36]. 
52 See above Part IIA. 
53 2003 (5) SA 173 (SCA). 
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documents and documents produced verbatim by a scribe from the deceased's 
dictation also meet the requirement of personal drafting.54 However, it is uncertain, 
despite this leeway afforded in Bekker, whether an audio tape qualifies as a 
personally-drafted document under s 2(3) of the Wills Act 1953. The South African 
Law Commission's insistence, in its report that preceded the introduction of the Wills 
Act's testamentary rescue dispensation, on writing as the only 'acceptable and 
manageable' medium for the capturing of testators' dispositive intent and the 
commission's consequent rejection of the statutory recognition of video-taped wills 
support this standpoint.55 
The second reason why the Treacey case would have yielded a different outcome 
before a South African court relates to Austin J's opinion on incorporation by 
reference as an alternative ground for securing probate of the audio tape in that case. 
South African law does not recognise the English-law doctrine of incorporation by 
reference. South African law's rejection of the doctrine stems from the Wills Act's 
(and many of its provincial predecessors') requirement that each page of a 
testamentary instrument be executed in accordance with the prescribed 
formalities — another document not so executed at the time of a will's execution can, 
therefore, not be incorporated into a will through that will's reference to such a 
document.56 Kannemeyer J confirmed in Burnett NO v Kohlberg57 that, under South 
African law, 'no document, irrespective of its nature, can be incorporated in a will by 
reference'.58 It is, in this light, interesting to note Hattingh J's remark in Macdonald v 
The Master59 that the condonation of the 'printed will and testament as found on the 
computer' in that case obviated the need to decide the matter on the basis of 
incorporation by reference.60 It can be inferred from his Honour's remark that, had 
he not condoned the 'printed will and testament as found on the computer' but 
instead condoned the handwritten note that referenced the will on the computer, any 
attempt at procuring the Master's acceptance of the printed computer document via 
the rescued handwritten note's reference to it would have been unsuccessful for 
violating South African law's non-adherence to the doctrine of incorporation by 
reference. 
 
III The intention requirement 
A. Introductory observations 
Australian dispensing provisions generally engage with the deceased's intention 
through two requirements for testamentary rescue: the instrument in question must 
embody the deceased's testamentary intentions, and the deceased must have 
54 Ibid, at [8]. 
55 South African Law Commission (Project 22), Report on Review of the Law of Succession, 1991, at [2.166]-[2.167]. 
56 Moses v Abinader 1951 (4) SA 537 (A) at 553A-G; Estate Orpen v Estate Atkinson 1966 (2) SA 639 (C) at 645A-B; 
Corbett, Hofmeyr and Kahn, above n 12, pp 66-8. 
57 1984 (2) SA 137 (E). The abbreviation 'NO' in the judgment's citation stands for 'Nomine Officio', indicating that a litigant 
acted in an official, and not in a personal, capacity — eg, in Burnett's case the applicant sought, in his capacity as the 
executor of a deceased estate, an order against the first respondent. 
58 Ibid, at 143D. 
59 2002 (5) SA 64 (O). See above Part IIA. 
60 Ibid, at 72G-H. 
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intended that instrument to constitute his or her will. The South African condonation 
provision requires simply that the deceased must have intended the instrument as his 
or her will. Vines shows that, despite some courts having approached the matter 
differently from time to time, the so-called 'document-centered approach' has become 
dominant in Australia: the instrument in question must embody the deceased's final 
post-mortem dispositions, and the deceased must have intended that very document 
as his or her will.61 Recent South African legal scholarship proposed that the South 
African condonation provision's intention requirement is, in fact, no different from 
those of its Australian counterparts. For example, Wood-Bodley argues that it is 
jurisprudentially incorrect to typify a mere general inclination to make a will as a 
form of animus testandi (the intention to make a will) — unless and until a testator 
has recorded his or her final wishes in a document intended to operate as a will, such 
a testator has not (yet) achieved the state of mind acknowledged by South African law 
as animus testandi.62 South African law, therefore, relates pertinently a testator's 
intention to make a will to the recorded manifestation of that dispositive intent in a 
document intended to operate as such. In this light, it is submitted that the South 
African Wills Act's condonation provision's engagement with the deceased's intention 
is on par with those of its Australian counterparts. 
South African condonation judgments support the foregoing contention. In Ex 
parte Porter,63 for example, Binns-Ward J stated that the words 'the document' in s 
2(3) of the Wills Act 1953 cannot be construed widely to include any document that 
reflects (even exactly) the contents of the intended testamentary instrument; rather, 
these words must be confined to 'the narrower concept of the actual piece of paper in 
issue, which . . . is what the statutory provision has in contemplation'. 64  This 
standpoint corresponds with that expressed by, among others, the Supreme Court of 
Victoria in Estate of Peter Brock65 where Hollingworth J said that 'the legislature did 
not intend that any document expressing or reflecting testamentary intentions could 
be probated under s 9 [of the Wills Act 1997 (Vic)]; the testator must have intended 
the particular document to constitute a will, and for the document to immediately 
operate as his or her will at the time it was created or completed'.66 
Hollingworth J's aforementioned observation that the deceased must have intended 
the document in question to operate immediately as a will at the time of its creation 
or completion raises a further introductory point for comparison between the 
Australian and South African testamentary rescue dispensations, namely, in regard to 
the timing of the required intention. The South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
stated authoritatively in Van Wetten v Bosch 67  that the deceased's intention 
61 Vines, above n 8, at 7. See also R Atherton, 'Dispensing with Wills Formality in Australia: The Problem of the Draft Will 
in the Tranquil Revolution' (1994) 2 APLJ 68 at 70-5. 
62 M C Wood-Bodley, 'Can Section 2(3) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 Properly Be Applied to a Mere Instruction to Draft a 
Will? Mabika v Mabika' (2013) 130 S Afr LJ 244 at 255. 
63 2010 (5) SA 546 (WCC). 
64 Ibid, at [11]. In Porter the court held, therefore, that the Wills Act's condonation provision cannot rescue an emailed copy 
of a validly-executed codicil where the latter was lost subsequent to its execution: at [8]. 
65 (2007) 1 ASTLR 127; [2007] VSC 415; BC200709039 (24 October 2007). 
66 Ibid, at [29]. 
67 2004 (1) SA 348 (SCA). 
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regarding the instrument in question must be established at the time of the 
instrument's creation or execution, and that evidence of a subsequent change of mind 
on the deceased's part is, consequently, irrelevant and inadmissible.68 This finding 
ostensibly negated earlier suggestions by South African lower courts that a 
subsequent transformation in the deceased's intention towards the document in 
question warranted judicial consideration.69 However, the facts of Van Wetten were 
peculiar. The deceased handed an envelope, addressed to his solicitor and containing 
the disputed document, to a friend with the instruction that it should be opened only 
in the event that something were to happen to the deceased. The court inferred from 
the evidence on the handing-over of the envelope that the deceased contemplated 
suicide at the time of the document's production. This inference led the court to the 
conclusion that the deceased did not intend for the friend to deliver the document to a 
solicitor for the preparation of a will. Instead, the deceased envisaged that, at the time 
when the envelope would be opened and the document read, he would already be 
dead and, therefore, unable to execute any will prepared in accordance with the 
document contained in the envelope. In the court's opinion this showed that the 
deceased intended the document from the outset as a will, rather than instructions for 
the preparation of a will.70 
Wood-Bodley suggests that Van Wetten, in light of the case's peculiar facts, does 
not necessarily preclude condonation by a South African court in the scenario where a 
deceased prepared a document initially as an aide-memoire on possible testamentary 
dispositions, but then fell ill and informed family and friends that this document 
indicates how they must deal with his or her estate after death.71 This standpoint 
corresponds with that assumed by, among others, the NSW Court of Appeal in In the 
Estate of Masters (dec'd); Hill v Plummer; Plummer v Hill,72 a case where the 
deceased also handed over an informal document to a friend with the instruction that 
the document's directives should be implemented upon the deceased's death. 73  
Priestley JA acknowledged that the dispensing power (in terms of s 18A of the former 
Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898) could be applied to that document even 
though the deceased might not have intended it as a will at the time of its production, 
but subsequently intended it as such when he handed it to his friend.74 The court 
ordered the document's admission to probate in light of the deceased's transformed 
intention.75 The question regarding a transformation of a deceased's intention with 
regard to the instrument in question is explored further in the discussions hereafter 
on instructions for the preparation of wills and draft wills.76 
68 Ibid, at [21]. See also Harlow v Becker 1998 (4) SA 639 (D) at 643F-G; De Reszke v Maras 2006 (2) SA 277 (SCA) at 
[11]; M C Wood-Bodley, 'Tertius Bosch's Final Over: Van Wetten v Bosch' (2005) 122 S Afr LJ 52 at 55. 
69 See, eg, Kotze v Master of the Court [1998] 1 All SA 312 (NC) at 318e. 
70 Van Wetten v Bosch 2004 (1) SA 348 (SCA) at [18]-[19], [27]. 
71 Wood-Bodley, above n 68, at 57. 
72 [1994] 33 NSWLR 446; BC9405178. 
73 Ibid, at 464E-5A. 
74 Ibid, at 469C-E. 
75 Ibid, at 453F. 
76 See below Parts IIIB and C. 
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The different approaches to the timing of the required intention in Van Wetten on 
the one hand, and In the Estate of Masters on the other hand, but the similarity in the 
outcomes of the two cases, underscore the truism that the success (or not) of 
testamentary rescue invariably turns on the facts of each case. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Australian and South African courts have identified various indicators 
to be considered when adjudicating on testamentary rescue cases. It is equally 
unsurprising that the same indicators have been propounded in South Africa and the 
various Australian jurisdictions. Some such common denominators are: (i) the 
document's purport, tone and content (including the fact that it refers to itself as a 
will);77(ii) the document's form (particularly where it follows the usual construction 
of a will); 78  (iii) the deceased's knowledge of, or previous experience with, 
testamentary formalities; 79 (iv) the document's authenticity as a product of the 
deceased's actions;80 and (v) any indication by the deceased (whether by verbal or 
written statements, or through placement in a strategic location) that the informal 
document must be acted upon after his or her death.81 It is important to note, 
however, that the foregoing are indicators only, and they are, therefore, not in 
themselves determinative to the outcome of testamentary rescue cases in Australia 
and South Africa. 
The foregoing introductory overview provides a basis for the analysis hereafter of 
testamentary rescue's intention requirement in scenarios that have confronted courts 
in Australia and South Africa in the past. Three instances are considered: (i) 
instructions for the preparation of wills; (ii) draft wills; and (iii) suicide letters. 
B. Instructions for the preparation of wills 
Scholarly analyses of testamentary rescue jurisprudence in Australia and South Africa 
show that courts in both systems agree that, generally speaking, documents 
embodying mere instructions for the preparation of wills are incapable of 
testamentary rescue. Vines argues that instruction documents fall short of meeting 
the intention requirement under Australian jurisdictions' dispensing powers because 
they lack the requisite immediacy of intention insofar as they are not intended to 
77 Eg (Australia), Tsagouris v Bellairs (2010) 5 ASTLR 403; 269 LSJS 451; [2010] SASC 147; BC201003978 (28 May 
2010) at [23]; Re Estate of Gholam (dec) [2011] SASC 125; BC201105782 (4 August 2011) at [27]; and (South Africa) 
Horn v Horn 1995 (1) SA 48 (W) at 49I; Schnetler NO v Master of the Supreme Court [1999] 3 All SA 425 (C) at 433i; 
Smith v Parsons 2009 (3) SA 519 (D) at [22]; Van derMerwe v The Master 2010 (6) SA 544 (SCA) at [18]. 
78 Eg (Australia), Estate of Peter Brock (2007) 1 ASTLR 127; [2007] VSC 415; BC200709039 (24 October 2007) at [31]; 
Estate of the late Evert Jacob Bulder Evert Jan Bulder v Surya Kanta Evert Jan Bulder [2012] NSWSC 1328; 
BC201210528 (1 November 2012) at [40]; and (South Africa) O'Connor v The Master 1999 (4) SA 614 (NC) at 622B-E; 
Raubenheimer v Raubenheimer 2012 (5) SA 290 (SCA) at [11]. 
79 Eg (Australia), Estate of Peter Brock (2007) 1 ASTLR 127; [2007] VSC 415; BC200709039 (24 October 2007) at [34], 
[37]; Costa v The Public Trustee of NSW [2008] NSWCA 223 (17 September 2008) at [110]; Estate of Laura Angius; 
Angius v Angius [2013] NSWSC 1895; BC201316540 (17 December 2013) at [288]; and (South Africa) Anderson and 
Wagner NNO v The Master 1996 (3) SA 779 (C) at 783J-4B; De Reszke v Maras 2006 (2) SA 277 (SCA) at [17]. 
80 Eg (Australia), Belcastro v Belcastro [2004] WASC 111; BC200402966 (25 May 2004) at [15]; In the Estate of TLB 
(2005) 94 SASR 450; 243 LSJS 1; [2005] SASC 459; BC200510563 at [12]; Re Estate of Gholam (dec) [2011] SASC 
125; BC201105782 (4 August 2011) at [25]; and (South Africa) O'Connor v The Master 1999 (4) SA 614 (NC) at 622F-G; 
Macdonald v The Master 2002 (5) SA 64 (O) at 72C-G; De Reszke v Maras 2003 (6) SA 676 (C) at [25]; Van derMerwe v 
The Master 2010 (6) SA 544 (SCA) at [17]. 
81 Eg (Australia), Hough v Harris; Estate of Graham [2004] NSWSC 958; BC200409662 (18 October 2004) at [8]; Costa v 
The Public Trustee of NSW (2008) 1 ASTLR 56; [2008] NSWCA 223; BC200809445 (17 September 2008) at [24]; and 
(South Africa) Horn v Horn 1995 (1) SA 48 (W) at 49C; Smith v Parsons 2010 (4) SA 378 (SCA) at [16]-[19]. 
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operate immediately as wills at the time of their creation.82 Wood-Bodley, in his 
critique of the judgment in Mabika v Mabika83 (a case discussed hereafter on the 
condonation of a document headed 'Application for the Drafting of a Will'), opines in 
similar vein that, under South Africa's testamentary rescue dispensation, preliminary 
documents or documents that merely record the deceased's wishes without having 
been intended to take immediate effect as wills do not meet the condonation 
provision's intention requirement.84 
Judicial opinion in South Africa and Australia affirms the foregoing views. In 
Anderson and Wagner NNO v The Master, Thring J said: 
To me the words of s 2(3) of the Act are clear. The provisions of the subsection apply 
only to certain documents. To come within the ambit of the subsection the document 
concerned . . . must have been drafted or executed by the person concerned with a 
certain intention. That intention must have been that the document should itself 
constitute his will or an amendment of his will, as the case may be. An instruction by a 
testator to his attorney or other adviser to draft or prepare a will or an amendment of 
a will along certain lines or in certain terms, no matter how precisely defined, is not 
written with the intention required by the subsection, and consequently cannot be 
brought within its terms. The difference between a document which is intended by its 
maker to be his will, or an amendment of his will, on the one hand, and an instruction 
by him to another person to draw a will or an amendment to a will, is neither merely 
technical nor insubstantial: in my view it is fundamental. In the former case, the 
maker of the document intends it to constitute the final expression of his wishes as 
regards the disposal of his estate. It is not subject to change, save, perhaps, by means 
of a subsequent and entirely fresh and separate amendment or codicil. In the latter 
case, the maker of the document does not vest it with the same intention of finality: 
he anticipates that another document will, in due course, be prepared and placed 
before him for his consideration and approval, which he may or may not sign or alter, 
as he may wish when it is presented to him.85 
Hallen J observed in similar vein in Estate of Laura Angius; Angius v Angius: 
The sole question for the court is the status of the undated document — whether the 
court is satisfied that the deceased intended the undated document to form her will. It 
would not be sufficient if the court came to the view that the deceased had intended 
the undated document to record only her instructions for a will, or to be a draft will 
made to assist in the preparation of a final will by her then solicitors. Nor is it enough 
if the court is only satisfied that the undated document contained the deceased's ideas 
about her testamentary intentions. The document must be intended to be the legally 
82 Vines, above n 8, at 9. See also In the Estate of Parkinson (1988) 143 LSJS 336 at 340 where White J said that '[i]t does not 
require much professional or bench experience to realise that intending testators do change their minds between the time 
of "finally" giving instructions and the time of ultimate execution of their wills'. 
83 [2011] ZAGPJHC 109 (8 September 2011). 
84 Wood-Bodley, above n 62, at 251. 
85 1996 (3) SA 779 (C) at 784G-785A. See also, eg, Ex parte Williams: In re Williams' Estate 2000 (4) SA 168 (T) at 179C; 
Ndebele NNO v The Master 2001 (2) SA 102 (C) at [32]. 
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operative act which purports to dispose of the deceased's property upon her death 
and be intended by her to have present operation as her will.86 
However, instruments with the outward appearance of instructions for the 
preparation of wills have been admitted to probate in some Australian cases, either 
because they were in fact intended to operate as wills at the time of their creation 
despite their appearance, or, alternatively, because they were initially conceived as 
instructions but were subject to a subsequent transformation of intention on the 
deceased's part. Australian courts generally require, in the latter instance, that the 
deceased must have manifested the transformed intention through conduct with 
regard to the instrument in question, either through having signed it, having placed it 
with other personal documents, or having declared verbally that an instruction 
document henceforth constituted a will. 
Newman v Brinkgreve; The Estate of Floris Verzijden87 is an example of the former 
of the aforementioned two instances in which Australian courts admitted ostensible 
instruction documents to probate. In this case the deceased, while hospitalised, wrote 
what appeared to be instructions for the amendment of his will on the back of a form 
of the NSW Government Department of Health. He headed the document 'To Hamer 
& Hamer Legal', whereafter followed the proposed amendments.88 The document 
bore the deceased's signature and that of a single witness (ostensibly appended some 
time after the deceased signed the document).89 Hallen J, satisfied that the document 
purported to state the deceased's testamentary intentions,90 opined that the form of 
the document is not solely determinative to the success of testamentary rescue.91 His 
Honour, after having analysed the pertinent facts (among others that the deceased 
signed and dated the document; had it witnessed (albeit defectively); and referred to 
the document as his will)92concluded, despite the document's heading and its general 
tenor as a letter of instructions, that the deceased indeed intended this document 
from the outset as an alteration to his existing will.93 Consequently, Hallen J granted 
probate in solemn form of the deceased's will and the informal document.94 
National Australia Trustees Ltd v Fazey; The Estate of Nancy Elaine Lees, Late of 
Strathfield,95 on the other hand, is an example of the latter of the above-mentioned 
two instances. Here the deceased had an existing will but made handwritten notes on 
a notepad regarding the division of estate assets, funeral and cremation 
arrangements, as well as the nomination of executors. 96 The persons named as 
executors sought to prove this document under s 8 of the Succession Act 2006 
86 [2013] NSWSC 1895; BC201316540 (17 December 2013) at [281]-[282]. See also, eg, Estate of Peter Brock (2007) 1 
ASTLR 127; [2007] VSC 415; BC200709039 (24 October 2007) at [30]; Re Yates; Ex parte The Public Trustee [2008] 
WASC 211; BC200808573 (1 October 2008) at [47]-[48]. 
87 [2013] NSWSC 371; BC201301871 (18 April 2013). 
88 Ibid, at [16]-[17]. 
89 Ibid, at [21]. 
90 Ibid, at [88]. 
91 Ibid, at [117]. 
92 Ibid, at [119]-[122]. 
93 Ibid, at [123]. 
94 Ibid, at [125]. 
95 [2011] NSWSC 559; BC201103959 (10 June 2011). 
96 Ibid, at [7]. 
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(NSW).97 Windeyer AJ, again satisfied that the document set out the deceased's 
testamentary intentions,98 considered that the document was initially written as a list 
of instructions to the deceased's solicitor for the preparation of a new will. However, 
the evidence pointed to the deceased having changed her intention towards the 
document in the aftermath of being informed that, by reason of illness, she did not 
have long to live. Moreover, the deceased's ipssissima verba were that the notepad 
contained her final wishes.99 Windeyer AJ therefore granted probate of the informal 
document, particularly in light of the evidence on the deceased's transformed 
intention with regard thereto.100 
South African cases on applications for the condonation of instructions for the 
preparation of wills are, arguably, more uniform with regard to their outcomes, with 
only one judgment having elicited scholarly criticism regarding its jurisprudential 
soundness. In Letsekga v The Master 101  the deceased drafted an unexecuted 
document that ostensibly set out changes to his will, apparently to provide for the 
unborn child conceived with his partner.102 Navsa J, in a condonation application in 
respect of this document, had regard to the facts, among others, that the document 
was untitled and not signed by the deceased; that it did not refer to the deceased's 
existing will; that some of its stipulations could not be related to that will; and that 
the deceased had knowledge of testamentary execution formalities.103 His Honour 
ruled that the document might have been a reminder by the deceased to himself as to 
what terms in his will he intended to change, or it might have constituted instructions 
to someone to effect changes to his will, but that the deceased did not intend it finally 
as an amendment to his will.104 In De Reszke v Maras105 the appellant (a beneficiary 
under the disputed informal document) advanced the 'transformation-of-intention 
argument' and contended that the deceased initially prepared the document that was 
the subject of the condonation application as instructions to his solicitor for the 
drafting of a will, but that the deceased's intention regarding the document 
subsequently changed and that, thereafter, he intended the document as his final will. 
The appellant relied in support of this contention on, among others, the facts that the 
deceased signed the document; that he had it witnessed (albeit defectively); and that 
he wrote the words 'no more suffering' on the document.106 Mlambo JA found this 
contention without merit because the deceased, after he had made the disputed 
document, gave instructions to a different solicitor for the drafting of a new will; 
moreover, the document did not conform to the deceased's knowledge of 
testamentary execution formalities.107 
97 Ibid, at [8]. 
98 Ibid, at [18]. 
99 Ibid, at [19]-[20]. 
100 Ibid, at [22]. 
101 1995 (4) SA731 (W). 
102 Ibid, at 732D-3C. 
103 Ibid, at 735H-7A. 
104 Ibid, at 736H, 737B. 
105 2006 (2) SA 277 (SCA). 
106 Ibid, at [13]-[14]. 
107 Ibid, at [15]-[17]. 
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The condonation applications in Letsekga and De Reszke were, therefore, 
unsuccessful because the documents in question were, in the opinions of the 
respective courts, intended as instructions and not as wills. Letsekga would 
undoubtedly have yielded a similar outcome before an Australian court. But would an 
Australian court have decided De Reszke's case differently? One can but speculate on 
the answer to this question; nevertheless, National Australia Trustees Ltd v Fazey; 
The Estate of Nancy Elaine Lees, Late of Strathfield, among others, suggests that 
Australian courts are more receptive to the 'transformation-of-intention argument' 
than their South African counterparts. An Australian court might, therefore, have 
considered favourably the appellant's argument in De Reszke regarding the 
deceased's transformed intention in respect of the informal document in question, 
which might have resulted in the judicial rescue of that document under an Australian 
dispensing provision. Australian courts have acknowledged, moreover, that so-called 
'stop-gap wills' are capable of testamentary rescue where the deceased intended the 
informal document in question as an interim statement of testamentary intent, to be 
superseded later by a properly-executed will.108 This phenomenon has not taken root 
in South Africa's testamentary rescue dispensation.109 It is arguable, however, that an 
Australian court, depending on its assessment of the case's pertinent facts, might 
have perceived the deceased's actions in De Reszke as indicative of an intention that 
the informal document in question had to operate as a stop-gap testamentary 
instrument until his subsequent instructions to the solicitor for the drafting of a new 
will came to fruition, and, therefore, that such a court might have dispensed with that 
document's formal invalidity.110 
Mabika v Mabika111 is best described as the 'odd one out' among South African 
cases on point. Here the deceased completed a document from her bank headed 
'Application for the drafting of a Will', which stated that the bank would 'endeavour to 
prepare [a will] compatible with the Client's instructions'. It is not apparent from the 
judgment whether the deceased signed this form, but she placed a handwritten 
statement at the end thereof regarding burial, her children's ownership of property, 
and the division of the proceeds of policies and investments. The deceased undertook 
to sign the will once the bank had prepared it, but, if the bank did in fact do so (the 
judgment is silent on this point), she died without executing a will.112 The applicants 
(the deceased's children and a grandchild) sought condonation of the aforementioned 
application form under s 2(3) of the Wills Act 1953. It is important to note that, in the 
108 See, eg, In the Estate of Masters (dec'd); Hill v Plummer; Plummer v Hill [1994] 33 NSWLR 446 at 469; BC9405178; 
Public Trustee v New South Wales Cancer Council — the Estate of Rita Lillian McBurney [2002] NSWSC 220; 
BC200202004 (15 March 2002) at [47]; Yazbek v Yazbek [2012] NSWSC 594; BC201203869 (1 June 2012) at 
[104]-[105]. 
109 See, eg, Kotze v Master of the Court [1998] 1 All SA 312 (NC) where the court refused condonation of a document, 
handwritten by the deceased and signed by a single witness, that benefitted the applicant, the deceased's (then) fiancee. 
The court did not regard this document's creation as an attempt at a stop-gap will during the subsistence of the 
engagement, but reasoned that the deceased intended to execute the document (and, hence, bestow validity onto it) only 
after his marriage to the applicant (which, by reason of the deceased's death, never occurred). The court, therefore, 
construed the deceased's intention regarding the document as conditional in nature, which negated any possibility of the 
document's rescue: at 319a-c. 
110 See also Wood-Bodley, above n 62, at 249. 
111 [2011] ZAGPJHC 109 (8 September 2011). 
112 Ibid, at [11]. 
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absence of such a condonation order, the first respondent, the deceased's husband 
with whom she had had a very strained relationship, would have been one of the 
deceased's intestate heirs.113Moshidi J granted the condonation order.114 
South African legal scholars have not, however, received his Honour's judgment 
favourably. Wood-Bodley argues that Moshidi J failed to engage adequately with the 
condonation provision's intention requirement, and that, therefore, the judgment 
evinces no appreciation of the distinction between a general intention to benefit or 
disinherit someone on the one hand, and the requisite intention that a particular 
document be one's will on the other hand.115 Wood-Bodley's view is based partly on 
Moshidi J's stance that, in light of the strained relationship between the deceased and 
her husband, she would not have wished for him to benefit from her estate and that, 
consequently, it would have been unfair and unjust for him to have inherited on 
intestacy. 116  Wood-Bodley argues, rightly it is submitted, that these factors are 
irrelevant to a condonation application.117 Van der Linde expresses a similar view, 
and points out that South African law does not permit judicial invocation of 
(un)fairness and (in)equity as freestanding norms in the resolution of legal disputes. 
Van der Linde opines, therefore, that Moshidi J's judgment is jurisprudentially 
unsound insofar as it ignored the condonation provision's intention requirement, but 
relied instead on considerations not pertinent to testamentary rescue. 118  It is 
submitted, therefore, that Mabika's outcome should have corresponded with those in 
Letsekga and De Reszke, and that the judgment is not typical of South African courts' 
approach to instructions for the preparation of wills in the context of testamentary 
rescue. 
 
C. Draft wills 
Courts in South Africa and Australia have remarked on testators' tendency to change 
their minds regarding their testamentary dispositions, even after draft wills have 
attained ostensibly final versions.119 In the normal course of events, the fate of a draft 
will is determined by subsequent conduct in respect thereof — it is either fully 
executed (at which point it becomes a valid will); or the testator alters its provisions 
(in which case it is not a will unless the altered version is subsequently fully 
executed), or it is not executed at all (in which case it is not a will). In the context of 
113 In terms of the Intestate Succession Act 1987 s 1(1)(c)(i). 
114 Mabika v Mabika [2011] ZAGPJHC 109 (8 September 2011) at [19]. 
115 Wood-Bodley, above n 62, at 257. 
116 Ibid, at 258. See Mabika v Mabika [2011] ZAGPJHC 109 (8 September 2011) at [15] for these aspects of the judgment. 
117 Ibid. 
118 A van der Linde, 'Longfellow v BOE Trust Ltd NO (13591/2008) [2010] ZAWCHC 117; Mabika v Mabika [2011] 
ZAGPJHC 109; Taylor v Taylor [2011] ZAECPEHC 48: Requirements in Terms of Section 2(3) of the Wills Act 7 of 
1953: Some Comments on Judgments in Recent Case Law' (2012) 45 De Jure 412 at 421-2. See also Wood-Bodley, 
above n 62, at 259. See the Supreme Court of Appeal's criticism in Potgieter v Potgieter NO 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA) at 
[34]-[36] of the judicial invocation of reasonableness and fairness as freestanding norms and the consequent threat 
occasioned by legal uncertainty to the rule of law in South Africa. 
119 See the respective judges' above-quoted remarks in Anderson and Wagner NNO v The Master 1996 (3) SA 779 (C) at 
784G-5A and Estate of Laura Angius; Angius v Angius [2013] NSWSC 1895; BC201316540 (17 December 2013) at 
[81]-[82]. Richings AJ observed astutely in Ramlal v Ramdhani's Estate 2002 (2) SA 643 (N) at 647F-G that testators are 
notoriously fickle in that the possibility always exists that their wishes may change in the period prior to final approval of 
their wills — a sentiment shared by White J in Estate of Parkinson (1988) 143 LSJS 336, above n 82. See also generally R 
F Croucher, 'Conflicting Narratives in Succession Law — A Review of Recent Cases' (2007) 14 APLJ 179 at 193-200. 
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testamentary rescue, however, courts have to adjudge the fate of draft wills in 
circumstances ranging from the deceased having signed the otherwise unexecuted 
document at the one end of the spectrum, to, at the other end of the spectrum, the 
deceased having performed no subsequent act at all with regard to the document. The 
question regarding the rescue of draft wills therefore turns, in South Africa and 
Australia, on the immediacy of the deceased's intention that the informal document 
in question operates finally as his or her will. Atherton analyses earlier Australian 
jurisprudence in her seminal article on the topic,120 and cautions against the judicial 
disregard of an appropriate form in which the deceased's intentions were cast because 
'[to] venture too far upon considerations as to the testator's conclusions as to the 
substance of her or his will, in the absence of formal execution, might be seen to 
dispense with wills formalities ... altogether'.121 Vines argues in similar vein that '[t]he 
presence or absence of a signature is a strong signal as to the testator's probable 
finality or lack of finality, and the courts treat it as such'.122 However, Australian 
courts have rescued unsigned draft wills where, in consonance with the 
above-discussed approach to instruction documents, the deceased dealt physically in 
some way with the document prior to his or her death and therefore manifested the 
finality of his or her intention in regard to that document.123 The discussion below 
shows that South African testamentary rescue case law reflects a similar trend. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal formulated South African law's approach in Van 
Wetten v Bosch:124 the question is not what the particular document means, but 
whether the deceased intended it as his or her will — an inquiry that necessitates an 
examination of the document itself within the context of the surrounding 
circumstances.125 South African courts have held in the application of this test that 
draft wills are generally not condonable. Ex parte Maurice126 (despite predating Van 
Wetten) is typical of this approach. In this case the deceased prepared a handwritten 
concept of what a joint will for his wife and him should stipulate. He forwarded this 
document to a friend to 'knock into shape' and 'put it into legal jargon'127 but died a 
short while later without having executed the final product. The handwritten draft 
was presented to the court for condonation. Selikowitz J opined that it is insufficient 
for the document at hand to reflect merely the deceased's distribution intentions; 
instead, the deceased must have intended the very document as his or her will.128 His 
Honour held, therefore, that the deceased intended the document before the court as 
instructions for the drafting of a will or, at most, as a preliminary draft will, but 
120 Atherton, above n 61. 
121 Ibid, at 77. 
122 Vines, above n 8, at 8. 
123 See the authoritative statement to this effect by the Court of Appeal of Western Australia in 
Oreski v Ikac [2008] WASCA 220; BC200809666 (30 October 2008) at [54]-[55]. See also the discussion of some earlier 
judgments on point by P Vines, 'When is the Testator's Intention the Requisite Intention Under the Dispensing Power?: 
The Need for Physical Dealing with the Will: Estate of Trickey (No 1) (1994) 34 NSWLR 539 and Estate of Masters; Hill 
v Plummer (1994) 33 NSWLR 446; BC9405178' (1995) 3 APLJ 152. 
124 2004 (1) SA 348 (SCA). 
125 Ibid, at [16]. 
126 1995 (2) SA 713 (C). 
127 Ibid, at 717F. 
128 Ibid, at 716J-7A. 
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certainly not as the final will of his wife and him.129 Selikowitz J consequently refused 
to order condonation.130Brand J elaborated in Ndebele NO v Master of the Supreme 
Court 131  and held that, if the evidence points to the fact that the deceased 
contemplated the production of another document for approval and execution, any 
preceding informal document, whether instructions or a preliminary draft, is not 
condonable.132 
South African courts have condoned draft wills or concept documents when the 
evidence showed, as in Van Wetten discussed earlier,133 that the deceased, because of, 
for example, contemplation of suicide and therefore imminent death, did not intend 
the instrument in question as a mere provisional statement of dispositive intent, but 
intended it as constituting his or her final testamentary dispositions at the time of its 
creation.134 Abrahams v Francis 
NO135 provides a variation on this theme. In this case the deceased, ostensibly while 
contemplating suicide, drafted a handwritten but unexecuted document regarding 
the disposition of his assets upon death. The deceased did not, however, commit 
suicide but died of a heart attack (or possibly in the resultant accident while cycling to 
visit family). Bozalek J held that the deceased's decision not to commit suicide did not 
exclude the informal document from condonation.136 His Honour ruled, in light of the 
circumstances surrounding the document's creation (among others, the document's 
contents and the fact that the deceased retained it amongst his private papers), that 
the deceased did indeed intend it as his final will from the outset.137 The court granted 
the condonation order.138 Taylor v Taylor139 also supports the reasoning in Van 
Wetten and Abrahams despite its different outcome. Here Griffiths J refused 
condonation of a so-called 'wish list' that the deceased drafted, signed and dated 
approximately 2 months prior to his death from terminal lung cancer. The document 
lacked attestation by witnesses. His Honour opined that, at the time of the 
document's preparation, the deceased must have been aware that his death was near, 
but that the evidence did not support a contention that his death was so imminent 
that he was unlikely to have had an opportunity to have the document formally 
executed if he so wished.140 Taylor's case is, therefore, distinguishable on the facts 
from that in Van Wetten, and, given the two courts' uniform approach to the 
condonation provision's intention requirement, the court's refusal to grant 
condonation in Taylor is hardly surprising. 
129 Ibid, at 717F-G. 
130 Ibid, at 717H. See also Williams: In re Williams' Estate 2000 (4) SA 168 (T) at 179A-C. 
131 [2000] 1 All SA 475 (C). 
132 Ibid, at [33]. 
133 See above Part IIIA. 
134 See also Mdlulu v Delarey [1998] 1 All SA 434 (WLD) at 444a-b where, in a successful condonation application with 
regard to a defectively-executed document that purported to be the deceased's will, the court remarked that '[i]t is clear 
from the content of the document that the deceased contemplated her death, that she intended to make disposition of the 
assets comprising her estate, and that she intended this document to be a final instruction regarding the disposal of her 
estate'. See also Wood-Bodley, above n 62, at 249. 
135 [2010] ZAWCHC 542 (10 November 2010). 
136 Ibid, at [14]. 
137 Ibid, at [14], [21], [23]. 
138 Ibid, at [26]. 
139 2012 (3) SA 219 (ECP). 
140 Ibid, at [20]. 
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However, South African courts have handed down a number of controversial 
judgments on draft wills or concept documents in the past. In Longfellow v BOE 
Trust Ltd NO,141 for example, the court refused condonation of an unexecuted will kit 
completed by the deceased's husband. The court based its ruling on the fact that the 
deceased did not intend the document as her final will.142 However, Baartman J's 
engagement with the condonation provision's intention requirement in this case is 
puzzling, because the matter should have been disposed of on the basis that the 
deceased neither drafted personally nor executed the document in question. 143  
In Dikgale v The Master of the High Court, Polokwane 144 diary entries in the 
deceased's native African language (translated into English for the purpose of the 
proceedings) regarding dealings with her property upon death were condoned 
because Teffo J was satisfied that the deceased intended the diary extracts as her 
will.145 However, the judgment's engagement with jurisprudence on the condonation 
provision's intention requirement can be described as scant at best, and 
Wood-Bodley's above-discussed criticism of Moshidi J's judgment in Mabika 
regarding a lack of judicial comprehension of the specific intention required for 
testamentary rescue is certainly apropos also to Teffo J's judgment in Dikgale. 
Testamentary rescue cases in South African High Courts are frequently heard by 
single judges (for example, Moshidi J in Mabika and Teffo J in Dikgale) — a fact that, 
arguably, contributes to the at times divergent (and hence contentious) outcomes of 
condonation judgments. Atherton remarks on a similar trend in Australia, with the 
result that jurisprudence on dispensing powers is often ad hoc in nature.146 The 
judicial weight accorded to a (slight) variation in the facts pertinent to otherwise 
comparable cases can, therefore, yield different outcomes in testamentary rescue 
cases. A comparison of two Australian judgments on the rescue of draft wills 
underscores this point. In Deeks v Greenwood147 the deceased's solicitors prepared a 
draft will in accordance with the deceased's instructions. The deceased, who had been 
informed that the document required execution to ensure its validity, confirmed 
verbally that the document represented his final wishes, but died before keeping the 
appointment for the execution thereof. 148  Heenan J, echoing Atherton's 
aforementioned view, remarked that '[i]t is not surprising . . .  that the authorities 
show instances of mixed success when attempts have been made to prove as an 
informal will a document prepared as a conventional will but, for various reasons, 
never actually executed by the deceased'.149 His Honour reasoned that the deceased in 
this case settled finally upon his testamentary intentions, which were conveyed to his 
solicitors, and that the deceased was satisfied with the terms of the resultant draft 
will. The deceased gave instructions for a final will to be prepared in those terms, but 
141 [2010] ZAWCHC 117 (28 April 2010). 
142 Ibid, at [27], [28]. 
143 See above Part IIB. See also Van der Linde, above n 118, at 415. 
144 [2013] ZAGPPHC 85 (26 March 2013). 
145 Ibid, at [26]. 
146 Atherton, above n 61, at 70. 
147 [2011] WASC 359; BC201110191 (22 December 2011). 
148 Ibid, at [45], [53]. 
149 Ibid, at [75]. 
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his sudden decline in health prevented that will from being executed. Heenan J 
accordingly ordered that the draft be accepted as an informal will expressing the 
deceased's testamentary intentions.150 
In Rowe v Storer,151 on the other hand, the deceased's solicitor also prepared a draft 
will on the deceased's instructions, which was forwarded to the deceased under a 
covering letter directing its execution. 152 Evidence regarding an attempt by the 
deceased to sign the will at the solicitor's office was inconclusive, but the deceased 
died without having executed the draft will.153 McMillan J, evincing a manifestly 
document-centered approach,154insisted that the deceased must have intended the 
particular draft document as her will in order for it to be rescued.155 Her Honour 
highlighted a slight difference between the deceased's instructions to her solicitor on 
the one hand, and the actual draft produced by the latter on the other hand, and 
opined that the deceased might have insisted on a correction had she indeed 
consulted her solicitor prior to her death.156 Her Honour distinguished expressly the 
Deeks case from the one before her — in Deeks the deceased made arrangements to 
have the draft will executed, but in Rowe the evidence on this issue was inconclusive; 
in Deeks the deceased confirmed verbally his approval of the draft, but in Rowe the 
deceased did not; and in Deeks the draft captured accurately the deceased's 
testamentary intentions, but in Rowe the deceased might have insisted on further 
changes to the draft document.157 Her Honour consequently refused admission of the 
draft will to probate.158 
The Deeks and Rowe judgments show, therefore, how factual variations occasion 
differences in judges' assessments of deceased persons' intentions, and how these 
assessments affect the outcomes of testamentary rescue cases. It is submitted, 
therefore, that the core principles regarding the exercise of dispensing powers in 
Australian jurisdictions are clear, but these are of such a nature that their application, 
particularly with regard to the rescue of draft wills, requires a level of implication 
from the facts at hand that easily leads to different results depending on each judge's 
impression of those facts. In this light, it is unsurprising that Heenan J and McMillan 
J devoted the greater parts of their respective judgments to analyses of jurisprudence 
on the applicable dispensing provisions' intention requirements, and how such 
jurisprudence related to the facts in question in each case. However, had these cases 
served before South African courts such a course of action would have been 
unnecessary because neither document was executed nor drafted personally by the 
particular deceased. In Bekker v Naude159 the deceased's bank prepared a draft joint 
will for the deceased and his wife. The bank forwarded the draft to the deceased along 
150 Ibid, at [86]-[87]. 
151 [2013] VSC 385; BC201311493 (2 August 2013). 
152 Ibid, at [14]. 
153 Ibid, at [20]-[27], [29]. 
154 See above Part IIIA. 
155 Rowe v Storer [2013] VSC 385; BC201311493 (2 August 2013) at [46]. 
156 Ibid, at [48]. 
157 Ibid, at [57]. 
158 Ibid, at [61]. 
159 2003 (5) SA 173 (SCA). 
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with directions for its execution.160 Neither the deceased nor his wife executed the 
document.161 Approximately 5 years elapsed between these events and the deceased's 
death. 162 It is certainly arguable, given this inordinate length of time, that the 
deceased and his wife no longer intended the draft as their final will (hence their 
failure to execute it or physically interact with it in another way), and one can only 
speculate on the (conceivably significant) portion of the judgment the Supreme Court 
of Appeal would have devoted in its condonation ruling to the question of the 
deceased's intention in respect of the bank-drafted will. However, the court's strict 
interpretation of the condonation provision's drafting requirement163obviated that 
course of action, and the court, in a relatively brief judgment, dismissed the appeal 
against the lower court's refusal to issue a condonation order. The court did so simply 
on the ground that the deceased neither executed nor prepared personally the draft 
will.164 
The foregoing does not suggest that the South African condonation provision is 
better tailored than those of its Australian counterparts. However, in light of judicial 
pronouncements in both legal systems that the availability of testamentary rescue 
does not negate statutory prescripts on wills' formal validity,165 as well as Australian 
legal scholarship emphasising the relevance to testamentary rescue of a deceased's 
signature and/or physical interaction with the instrument in question, 166  it is 
arguable that the South African provision's drafted-or-executed requirement achieves 
a 'connectedness' between the particular document on the one hand, and the 
deceased's intention with regard to that document on the other hand. The 
comparison between the Deeks and Rowe judgments shows that such connectedness 
is certainly an important consideration in the rescue of draft wills. 
D. Suicide letters 
Australian and South African courts have been asked to rescue letters or notes written 
shortly before the drafters' suicides which contained, among other things, directives 
on dealing with their estates post-mortem. The letters or notes in these cases rarely 
conformed to the format in which wills are traditionally cast; moreover, they typically 
contained also personal messages, declarations of remorse and pleas for forgiveness. 
They were usually produced in the deceased's handwriting and sometimes bore his or 
her signature or name, but were invariably not duly executed in accordance with 
statutory formality prescripts. Is such a suicide letter or note capable of testamentary 
rescue? Australian and South African courts have answered this question in the 
affirmative.167 Moreover, judicial engagement with the deceased's intention regarding 
160 Ibid, at [2]. 
161 Ibid, at [3]. 
162 Ibid. 
163 See above Part IIB. 
164 Bekker v Naude 2003 (5) SA 173 (SCA) at [20]-[21]. 
165 Eg (Australia), Belcastro v Belcastro [2004] WASC 111; BC200402966 (25 May 2004) at [6]; Estate of Peter Brock 
(2007) 1 ASTLR 127; [2007] VSC 415; BC200709039 (24 October 2007) at [20]; and (South Africa) Logue v The Master 
1995 (1) SA 199 (N) at 203F; Anderson and Wagner NNO v The Master 1996 (3) SA 779 (C) at 785B-C. 
166 See Atherton, above n 121; Vines, above n 122. 
167 See, eg, MacDonald v MacDonald [2012] NSWSC 1376; BC201210552 (7 November 2012) at [8] where White J stated 
that the fact that the instrument in question is a suicide note does not preclude its admission to probate as an informal 
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a suicide letter or note has yielded remarkably similar trends and outcomes in past 
Australian and South African judgments. A comparison between the Costa judgments 
in New South Wales and the Smith judgments in South Africa illustrates this 
assertion. 
In Alexander Costa v The Public Trustee in the Estate of Robert Costa (aka Wayne 
Geary Coaster)168 the NSW Supreme Court was asked to declare a document in the 
deceased's handwriting, found amongst books and papers next to his bed after he had 
committed suicide, as the deceased's will pursuant to s 18A of the former Wills, 
Probate and Administration Act 1898. The document was written as a poem and 
requested the deceased's parents to look after his writings, but also stated that they 
should have his house.169Windeyer J conceded that the deceased must have produced 
the document at a time when his death was imminent; moreover, that the location 
where the document was found pointed to an intention on the deceased's part that it 
constituted his will.170 His Honour opined, however, that the following considerations 
pointed to an absence of the requisite intention: the document's precatory, rather 
than dispositive, wording; the deceased's familiarity with the formal requirements for 
a will's validity; the absence of the deceased's signature on the document; and the 
poetic form in which the deceased wrote the document.171 His Honour concluded that 
the document, given its form and wording, was a suicide note expressing wishes and 
requests and not a document intended to operate as a testamentary instrument. He 
accordingly dismissed the statement of claim for the grant of probate.172 
In Smith v Parsons NO 173  the Durban and Coast Local Division of the 
KwaZulu-Natal High Court, coram Luthuli AJ, was asked to condone a handwritten 
and dated suicide letter to which the deceased appended his nickname on the day of 
his death. The note was found under a crucifix on the kitchen counter in the 
deceased's home and purported to set out amendments to the deceased's existing will. 
The amendments were in favour of the deceased's female life-partner (the applicant) 
who was not a beneficiary in terms of the aforementioned will. The letter contained 
expressions of remorse and pleas for forgiveness, but also stated that the applicant 
'can have this house' as well as the money in the deceased's bank account. The letter 
mentioned, moreover, where the deceased's will was to be found, and that 'I leave 
everything else to Jeremy [the deceased's son] as stated therein'.174Luthuli AJ opined 
that the format, structure, contents and wording of the letter were not of the type 
normally found in testamentary instruments;175 moreover, that the deceased's use of 
'loose language' (precatory rather than dispositive) did not conform to the making of 
testamentary document under the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 8. In Horn v Horn 1995 (1) SA 48 (W) the court 
considered the condonation of an informal document written by the deceased on the day he committed suicide (after he 
had shot and killed his two children). 
168 [2007] NSWSC 1271; BC200709671 (12 November 2007). 
169 Ibid, at [7]. 
170 Ibid, at [15]. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid, at [19]. 
173 2009 (3) SA 519 (D). 
174 Ibid, at [6]-[10]. 
175 Ibid, at [22]. 
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testamentary bequests;176 and, finally, that the deceased's previous experience with 
wills and deceased estates rendered it unlikely that he intended the suicide letter as 
an amendment to his existing will.177 His Honour consequently refused condonation 
of the suicide letter. 178Hodgson JA, in an appeal against Windeyer J's primary 
judgment to the NSW Court of Appeal in Costa v The Public Trustee of NSW,179 
reasoned that the suicide letter, addressed to the deceased's parents, was clearly 
meant to come to their attention, and that this fact rendered the document's 
precatory wording, the absence of the deceased's signature thereon, and the 
deceased's knowledge of the formal requirements for the validity of wills of lesser 
importance in adjudicating on the deceased's intention.180 Of greater significance, 
according to his Honour, were the facts that the deceased wrote the letter on a solemn 
and unique occasion as a last message to his parents, and that the deceased must have 
known that, in the absence of the letter's disposition of the house to his parents, the 
house would go, in terms of his existing will, to a former acquaintance with whom he 
had lost contact.181 His Honour concluded, therefore, that the suicide letter purported 
to govern the disposition of the deceased's house; and that the deceased intended the 
implementation of this disposition after his death. 182  Hodgson JA accordingly 
allowed the appeal.183 The appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against Luthuli AJ's 
judgment in Smith v Parsons184 was also successful, and for reasons similar to those 
in Costa. Seriti AJA opined that the deceased must have known that his existing will 
made no provision for his partner, hence the provision for her in the suicide letter and 
the letter's 'clear and unequivocal' instructions regarding the award of the house and 
money to her.185 His Honour regarded, moreover, the letter's placement under the 
crucifix as a strong indication that the deceased intended for it to be found, and 
intended its instructions to be implemented after his death.186 Seriti AJA accordingly 
allowed the appeal.187 
The Costa and Smith cases were decided in different jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the 
respective courts of first instance on the one hand, and appeal courts on the other 
hand, had regard to the same documents - the respective suicide letters. Yet, the 
appeal judges' application of the law to the facts in both cases yielded diametrically 
opposite outcomes from those propounded by the respective primary judges. This is, 
arguably, a startling phenomenon, but underscores the fact that the outcomes of 
testamentary rescue cases, whether in Australia or South Africa, invariably turns on 
the judicial weight accorded to particular facts and, therefore, whether the informal 
176 Ibid, at [23]. 
177 Ibid, at [31]. 
178 Ibid, at [35]-[36]. 
179 (2008) 1 ASTLR 56; [2008] NSWCA 223; BC200809445 (17 September 2008). 
180 Ibid, at [24], [27]. 
181 Ibid, at [28]. 
182 Ibid, at [29]. 
183 Ibid, at [30]. Ipp JA and Basten JA concurred: at [52], [114]. 
184 2010 (4) SA 378 (SCA). 
185 Ibid, at [17]. 
186 Ibid, at [19]. 
187 Ibid, at [23]. Lewis JA, Heher JA, Mhlantla JA and Leach JA concurred: at [24]. 
24 
 
                                            
 
 
instrument's proponent(s) discharged the onus of proving the deceased's intention 
with regard to that instrument. 
IV Conclusion 
South African legal scholarship on testamentary rescue has, on occasion, taken 
cursory note of Australian jurisprudence on dispensing powers.188 However, very 
little (if any) comparative scholarship on testamentary rescue with South Africa as the 
comparable jurisdiction has to date appeared in Australia. The (perceived) divide 
between Australia's Common Law tradition and South Africa's mixed, though 
predominantly civilian, legal heritage may explain this phenomenon. This article 
shows, however, that English law shaped the law regarding wills' formal validity in 
Australia and South Africa. South Africa and the various Australian jurisdictions 
opted, moreover, for a judicial dispensing or condonation power as the appropriate 
mode of testamentary rescue to remedy the negative impact of formalism on testators' 
dispositive intent. In this light, it is unsurprising that courts in both systems have 
been confronted with similar challenges regarding testamentary rescue, and have 
resolved these challenges in broadly the same manner. It is equally unsurprising that 
the requirement regarding the deceased's intention, more so than testamentary 
rescue's other requirements, has posed the greatest challenge to South African and 
Australian courts. This article's comparative analysis shows, however, that in three 
particular instances — the rescue of instruction documents, draft wills, and suicide 
letters —Australian and South African courts have been relatively consistent in their 
interpretation and application of broadly corresponding statutory prescripts on 
testamentary rescue's intention requirement. These consistencies prevail despite the 
different legal traditions within which testamentary rescue operates in Australia and 
South Africa on the one hand, and variations in legislative formulation of the 
testamentary rescue provisions in the two countries' applicable statutes on the other 
hand. 
It was stated in this article's introduction that it set out, in its analysis of 
testamentary rescue's intention requirement in Australia and South Africa, to meet 
Orticui's three hallmarks of comparative-law research.189 It is submitted that this goal 
has been achieved. First, the article consolidates legal knowledge through its 
contextualised perspective on testamentary rescue in Australia and South Africa. 
Second, it acknowledges that court decisions constitute primary sources of law in 
Australia and South Africa, and it therefore explains convergences and divergences in 
Australian and South African courts' engagement with statutory prescripts on 
testamentary rescue, and their intention requirements in particular. Third, it relates 
testamentary rescue jurisprudence in Australia as a Common Law legal system to that 
in South Africa as a mixed jurisdiction with a strong civilian tradition.  
188 See, eg, De Waal, above n 38, at 423-34; Du Toit, above n 39, at 514-6; Wood-Bodley, above n 62, at 250-1. 
189 See Part I above. 
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